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In Federalist Papers No. 10, James Madison, writing under the pseudonym Publius, lamented the
dangers of what he called “faction.” Factions—which we might today call political parties—held
corruptive influence over the political process because such entities develop independent, institutional
instincts toward self-preservation that may eventually become antagonistic to the interests of the broader
people. Republicanism, managed through the reasonable faculties of men, would be to the cure to faction,
Madison envisioned. Nevertheless, just over two decades from Federalist 10’s publication in 1787,
Madison ran for president of the United States at the head of the 1808 Democratic-Republican ticket, and
thus became the leader of the largest faction hitherto known in American politics. But Madison was far
from the only Founding Father to change his position on political parties. “If I could not go to heaven but
with a party,” Thomas Jefferson shared privately with a friend, “I would not go there at all.” 1 Nevertheless,
when time came for Jefferson to express his presidential ambitions at the turn of the 19th century, he stood
as the Democratic-Republican candidate. In Jefferson’s estimation, he later wrote, when the chasm that
separates the parties is cavernous, it is “honorable to take a firm and decided part and […] immoral to
pursue a middle line, as between the parties of honest men and rogues, into which every country is
divided.”2 Thus, in the republic’s infancy, parties were cemented as the primary means of political
organization in the American system of governance.
I.

Toward a Theory of Party

The near-omnipresence of political parties in free, democratic societies has risen to the status of
inevitability. E. E. Schattschneider asserted that “political parties created democracy,” and therefore,
“democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties.” 3 But what is a political party? Why do they form so
consistently across democratic nations? Is the policy and administrative direction a political party more
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directed by candidates, officeholders, or party leaders? Political scientists have negotiated with these
questions over almost the past century and produced a number of distinct answers.
Joseph Schumpeter, the Austrian-born Harvard political economist, offered the first traces of a
modern theory of party in his 1942 work Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Schumpeter offered a
competitive model of party, in which politicians compete with each other for the support of the public.
Then, in Anthony Down’s 1957 book An Economic Theory of Democracy, the focus on competition
among politician in the Schumpeter conception is displaced with an emphasis on competition between
parties. Thus, shifts in the interior configurations of organized political parties were largely attributed to
exogenous shocks from the moves of rival parties. Political parties, in the Schumpeter-Downs framework,
become reactionary rivals vying for popular attention. Critics point to the numerous political actors—
organizers, grassroots activists, and perhaps even actual voters—whom this model silences amid the
raucous scuffles of inter-party conflict. Even so, this Schumpeter-Downs model of party gained
prominence in the 1960s as the study of political organization expanded. Meanwhile, the actual effect that
parties were demonstrated to have in the operation of the political system seemed to weaken. At the state
and federal level, it seemed that as the party nomination process was reformed, with the McGovern-Fraser
reforms particularly notable, the power that party leaders had to affect political outcomes seemed infirm
and insignificant.
The apparent weakening of party power also weakened the saliency of studying political
organization and political parties. The field branched off into various directions, with different sets of
scholars developing a theory of party to explain parochial aspects of overall party functions. This was
until John Aldrich wrote perhaps the most important work in the field of party theory in the recent history
of political science. Aldrich’s 1995 book Why Parties? compiled and synthesized the research literature
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on political parties into a sort of grand unifying theory of why and how political parties assert their
positions in the American political system.
In Why Parties? Aldrich built upon an unpublished paper by UCLA theorist Thomas Schwartz, in
which Schwartz imagined a hypothetical legislature of three. Schwartz thought that in such a circumstance,
two of the three legislators would cooperate to secure the greatest gains for their constituents while shifting
the losses onto the constituents of the third legislator. He called such cooperation a “long coalition”. 4
These long coalitions create a set of permanent winners who have great incentive to cooperate with each
other on a wide range of issues to ensure that the agenda most favorable to their collective and individual
interests is enacted. Schwartz contended that political parties form on the basis of a straightforward,
rational calculation: separate, the lawmakers are ineffective in a body that governs by majority rule;
together, the can secure significant gains for themselves and their stakeholders, even if those gains are not
entirely what the sought. In such a Hobson’s choice, achieving some legislative victories is a better
condition than endless bickering that achieves nothing at all.
Aldrich advances Schwartz framework by expanding it beyond the theoretical legislature and into
legislatures that govern. Why Parties? introduces the archetype of the ambitious politician. Political
parties, Aldrich thought, were the progeny of ambitious officeholders, office seekers, and politicians. They
do not form these parties to direct the benefits of the coalition to their constituents, although they do care
that their constituents are content and that the foundations of public policy are sound. What drives these
political actors, in Aldrich’s estimation, is the next election. Securing the right to govern depends of
winning popular support in polling booths. This is what ultimately matters to the ambitious officeholder
and thus forms the basis of here drive to ensconce herself in the ranks of a political party. Aldrich further
argued that, though his argument advanced a candidate-centered theory of party, the precise nature of the
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support that political parties offered to candidates had changed over time. Previously, parties focused on
what Aldrich called “mass mobilization”—featuring patronage, spoil systems, and political machines—
that moved voters toward candidates. Today, parties are “in-service” actors. They move candidates closer
to voters through training, consultants, polling, and fundraising. While candidates form their own
campaigns, build their own message, and run on their own merit under the in-service party model, the
ends of both the mass mobilization party and in-service party are traced back a single center of gravity:
getting ambitious office seekers into office and keeping ambitious officeholders in their positions. 5
The Schwartz-Aldrich theory of party offers answers two three substantial questions that are
fundamental to this project’s research: what are political parties? Why do they form? How do they operate?
A political party is a stable coalition of officeholders and office seekers who agree to cooperate on a wide
range of issues in order to build a winning coalition that secures political advantage in elections and
lawmaking. The political party forms a brand of sorts that becomes a shorthand for the beliefs, interests,
and values of the politicians, officeholders, and office seekers who walk under that party’s banner. In turn,
this brand reduces the transaction costs associated with seeking and maintaining office. Office seekers and
officeholders need not reintroduce themselves to the public each election because the party brand does
this on their behalf. Further, through services like electoral training and polling, the party helps office
seekers win elections.
II.

Long Coalitions in Virginia’s Chambers

a. Research Design
This project seeks to build upon the body of research literature that the Schwartz-Aldrich theory
has already generated by exploring the strength of party coalitions in Virginia’s General Assembly.
Specifically, the theory’s emphasis on the pursuit of electoral majorities as the central motive force for
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ambitious officeholders and office seekers seems to imply that, upon achieving such an electoral majority,
the long coalition grows stronger and more cohesive. This strengthening in the ties that bind lawmakers
in the governing party is vital in ensuring that they may execute on their legislative capacity with greatest
profit.
This research seeks to answer the question: do members of the majority caucus show greater
loyalty to their caucus’ interests than members of the minority caucus by voting with the caucus at a
greater frequency? This question is rooted in the premises of the Schwartz-Aldrich theory of party. Long
coalitions emerge from the ambitions of a community of officeholders and office seekers. Its aims are
focused on heightening the electoral and legislative advantage of being in the majority by cooperating
across a wide range of issues. Taking this as an axiom, it ought to follow that the voting patterns of those
who are members of the majority, governing caucus would be more closely aligned with each other than
those members of the minority, non-governing caucus. Further, we might also assume, on the basis of the
aforementioned axiom, that the relationship between caucus unity among the members of the majority
caucus and the partisan lean of the majority members’ districts would be weak. Conversely, the association
between caucus unity in the minority caucus and the partisan leans of minority member districts would
share a stronger relationship than that of the majority caucus. We might further postulate, based on the
long coalition axiom, that caucus unity, once quantified, would be skewed toward the upper strata of a
caucus unity distribution.
b. Methodology
In statistical terms, supporting the long coalitions thesis in state legislatures requires testing several
aspects of the thesis. First, we must prove that the voting patterns of majority members are more unified
than the voting patterns of minority members. In order to prove this, this research will use caucus unity
percentages, denoted as 𝐶, which is the proportion of votes in which a member voted with their caucus on
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the floor in circumstances where two thirds of the caucus voted in the same way. Mathematically, 𝐶 is
expressed as:
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑦𝑛𝑐 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑠
∗ 100
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑡𝑤𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑢𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑦

This project will compare the caucus unity in the majority and minority caucuses taking the average caucus
unity percentage and comparing these sample statistics directly. We expect the mean caucus unity
percentage to be higher in the majority caucus than in the minority caucus, which would demonstrate
higher levels of cohesion in voting patterns among members of the majority caucus. This project would
seek to further examine caucus unity by calculating the average distance around the mean caucus unity
percentage, which is the standard deviation, denoted here as 𝜎, where,
𝑛

1
𝜎 = √ ∑(𝑥𝑖 − 𝐶)2
𝑛
𝑖=1

In order to offer statistical evidence of the long coalitions thesis, we expect that the standard deviation in
the majority caucus will be similar to or smaller than the standard deviation in caucus unity percentages
of the minority caucus’s members. Finally, we expect that the median caucus unity percentage in the
majority caucus will be higher than the median caucus unity in the minority caucus. Further, to test the
relationship between caucus unity percentages and partisan lean, we must calculate a Pearson’s correlation
coefficient or Pearson’s r to determine the size and magnitude of the association. Prior to this, however,
we must offer some methodology to calculate partisan lean, or 𝑝. First, we calculate the presidential district
spread by subtracting the percentage of votes obtained by the last Republican presidential candidate in the
district from the percentage of votes obtained by the Democratic presidential candidate:
𝑥𝑑 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡
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We do a similar calculation for the previous gubernatorial election:
𝑦𝑑 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡

Finally, we average these two values and produce the average district spread 𝑑.

𝑑=

𝑥𝑑 ∙ 𝑦𝑑
2

We repeat these calculations for the two parties’ candidates across the state in the last presidential and
gubernatorial elections, to calculate average statewide spread 𝑠:
𝑥𝑠 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒 − 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒
𝑦𝑠 = 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛 𝑔𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒 − 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑔𝑢𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑒

𝑠=

𝑥𝑠 ∙ 𝑦𝑠
2

Then, we average 𝑑 and 𝑠 to get partisan lean 𝑝. If 𝑝 has a negative value, this indicates a Democratic
partisan lean. Having calculated the partisan leans of each district, we compute a Pearson’s r between the
absolute values of partisan leans and the caucus unity percentages for the members of the majority and
minority caucuses, as well as those in strong (𝑝 ≥ 20), leaning (𝑝 < 20; ≥ 10) or competitive (𝑝 < 10)
districts. We will further compute correlations for Democratic and Republican incumbents. Finally, we
describe that coefficient in terms of a weak, moderate, or strong positive or negative relationship. In order
to determine the skew in the caucus unity distribution, we will build a density function and plot that
function in a visualization.6
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c. Results

2020 House Caucus Unity Percentages

Mean

Median



Democratic caucus
(majority)

93.6%

95.0%

6.1%

Republican caucus
(minority)

87.3%

88.0%

5.9%

The results of the methodology above tended to
support my assertion that the majority caucus
shows greater cohesion than minority caucuses.
The average caucus unity percentage in the
House Democratic caucus during the 2020
regular session, in which Democrats held the
majority, was 93.6 percent. In other words, if
one were to postulate a theoretical Caucus Democrat, an individual who voted perfectly in line with the
mean of the caucus, that individual would vote with their caucus on about 94 out of every 100 floor votes.
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Meanwhile, House Republicans had
an average caucus unity percentage of 87.3
percent. Thus, a similarly situated, theoretical
Caucus Republican would vote with their
caucus on 87 out of every 100 floor votes. The
Caucus Democrat would show greater loyalty
to the interests of the Democratic caucus than
would the Caucus Republican to the
Republican caucus. The median caucus unity
percentage in the Democratic caucus was 95
percent, substantially higher than the 88
percent median caucus unity percentage
among House Republicans. Further, the
interquartile range for the median Democratic
caucus unity percentages is 3 percent. For the Republican caucus, the interquartile range is 6 percent.
Finally, the average distance 𝜎 around the mean caucus unity percentage is 6.1 percent in the Democratic
caucus. This is nearly equal to 𝜎 computed for the Republican caucus, which was 5.9 percent.

2019 House Caucus Unity Percentages

1Values

Mean

Median



Democratic caucus
(minority)

89.6%

90.0%

6.2%

Republican caucus
(majority)

88.6%

89.5%

7.9%

rounded to the nearest tenth.
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This result contrasts with the patterns
of caucus unity seen in the 2019 regular
session.

During

that

session,

House

Republicans were in the majority. The mean
caucus unity percentage in the Democratic
caucus was 89.6 percent with 𝜎 of 6.2
percent. In the Republican caucus, mean
caucus unity was 88.6 percent with 𝜎 of 7.9 percent. Meanwhile, the median caucus unity percentage in
the Democratic caucus was 90 percent with an interquartile range of 6.5 percent. The Republican caucus
has a median caucus unity percentage of 89.5 percent with an interquartile range of 10.75 percent.
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In the Senate, a similar trend
emerges upon examining the data on

2020 Senate Caucus Unity Percentages

caucus unity. The mean caucus
Mean

Median



Democratic Caucus
(majority)

90.8%

92.0%

6.2%

Republican Caucus
(minority)

84.5%

87.0%

7.1%

unity percentage in the Senate
Democratic caucus, which was in
the majority during the 2020 regular
session, was 90.8 percent with 𝜎 of
6.2 percent. This means that a
theoretical Caucus Democrat in the Senate would
vote with their party on about 91 out of every 100
floor votes. In the Senate Republican caucus, the
mean caucus unity percentage was 84.5 percent with
𝜎 of 7.1 percent. Thus, a postulated Caucus
Republican would vote with their caucus on 85 out
of every 100 floor votes. The median caucus unity percentage in the Republican caucus was 87 percent
with an interquartile range of 10.5 percent. In the Democratic caucus, the median caucus unity percentage
was 92 percent with an interquartile range of 6 percent.
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2019 Senate Caucus Unity Percentages
Mean

Median



Democratic Caucus
(minority)

86.9%

89.0%

6.5%

Republican Caucus
(majority)

87.4%

89.5%

8.2%

In comparison to the 2020 regular session,
Senate Democrats in the 2019 regular session had
a mean caucus unity percentage of 86.9 percent
with 𝜎 of 6.5 percent. Senate Republicans,
meanwhile, had a mean caucus unity percentage of
87.4 percent with 𝜎 of 8.2 percent. The median
caucus unity percentage was 89 percent for Senate Democrats, with an interquartile range of 5 percent.
Senate Republicans had a median caucus unity percentage of 89.5 percent and an interquartile range of
6.5 percent.
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Correlation with partisan lean 𝒑1
House of Delegates

partisan lean and caucus unity in the House
Democratic caucus during the 2020 regular

2020 Session

2019 Session

Democratic
Caucus

0.093

0.268

Republican
Caucus

0.269

0.011

session has a Pearson’s r of 0.093; the
relationship for House Republicans is
0.269. For comparison, the magnitude
trend in the Pearson’s r for the two

caucuses was reversed in the 2019 regular session, with the smaller correlation coefficient (0.011) seen
among House Republicans and the larger correlation coefficient (0.268) among Senate Democrats. The
association between mean caucus unity and partisan lean among Senate Republicans in the 2020 regular
session had a Pearson’s r of 0.176,
compared

with

0.066

for

Senate

Correlation with partisan lean 𝒑1
Senate

Democrats. Similar to the House of
2020 Session

2019 Session

Democratic
Caucus

0.066

0.250

Republican
Caucus

0.176

0.069

Delegates, the trend in magnitude was in
reverse in the 2019 regular session—Senate
Republicans had a Pearson correlation
coefficient of 0.069 and Senate Democrats
had a correlation coefficient of 0.250.
III.

Conclusion

On the basis of this research, the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that there is a
substantial increase in cohesion that results from the minority party becoming the governing party—as
was the case with Democrats from 2019 to 2020. The mean caucus unity percentage for House Democrats
increased by about 4.5 percent between 2019 and 2020. House Republicans, meanwhile, saw their unity
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decline by about 1.5 percent. In the Senate, Democrats saw a similar upward trend in cohesion, with their
mean caucus unity percentage increased by about 4.3 percent, while Republicans saw their cohesion
decrease, with their mean caucus unity percentage decreasing by about 3.3 percent. Further, the median
caucus unity increased in Senate Democrats by about 3.4 percent, while the median for Senate Republicans
decreased by around 2.8 percent. The Pearson’s r between caucus unity percentages in the House and
Senate Democratic caucuses declined substantially between 2019 and 2020. This is consistent with our
expectations, because the greater the unity within the governing caucus, the less of a determinant partisan
lean becomes in voting patterns. The opposite trend was seen among House and Senate Republicans.
IV.
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